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Abstract
We select one firm from a large data set of firms and study its internal economics. First we prove that
the information available allows us to inspect the personnel policies of the firm. Furthermore, this fact
allows moving from the case study to more comprehensive studies in personnel economics using
institutional surveys. The analysis also shows the patterns of workers' promotions and the differences in
the characteristics of insider versus outsider workers. The decision to promote is analyzed. The
hierarchic design directly influences the wage policy. Wages are determined to a great extent by the
layers of the hierarchy. There are wage premiums upon promotion, even if the worker does not change
his place in the organization. When the promoted worker moves up in the hierarchy he comes from the
top of the wage distribution at the old job and goes to the bottom of it in the new job. We present
evidence on workers' exit and entry to the bottom of the wage distribution, especially in the lower part
of the hierarchy.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we study the internal economics of a firm. We analyze the hierarchy
structure, the promotion policy, workers' entry and exit from the firm, and the
relationship between the layers in the hierarchy, promotions and pay.
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2The firm was drawn essentially at random from a large sample of firms. The
sample comes from a firm-based survey (Quadros de Pessoal) conducted by the
Portuguese authorities every year. We have five years of data. The survey contains
personnel data and covers a great proportion of the Portuguese firms. As far as we
know, it is the first time an attempt has been made to pursue this type of study using
the survey Quadros de Pessoal. The study is a first step in a larger analysis research
project. We intend to apply the same type of procedures to the sample of firms across
the board. We start with a case study because we need to establish if the information
contained in the data set is valid for an internal analysis of firms. Furthermore, the
study of a particular firm, albeit an individual case study, has a value in and of itself.
There are several results in the personnel economics literature that we intend to set
against the evidence presented in the study of the internal organization of "our" firm.
The paper is in part descriptive in the sense that we first identify the structure of the
hierarchy, promotion policies, and pay policies of the firm.
There are relatively few works on the applied internal labor market. One reason for
this is due to the scarcity of good personnel records. Among those works are the
papers of Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1993, 1994a, b). The authors analyze twenty
years of personnel data from one firm, focusing on the hierarchy, promotion policies,
port of entry and exit, pay policies and their relationship with the hierarchical levels.
The present study is in the spirit of these papers. Medoff and Abraham (1980) study
personnel records from two large firms. It challenges the prediction that worker's
experience positively influences its wage. The analysis shows that experience is not
positively related with the worker's performance. McCue (1996) presents evidence on
the positive and important effect that workers' movements inside the firm have on
wage growth. More recently Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello (1999) study the promotion
policy of a firm, while Lazear (1999) explores some new directions with the analysis
of personnel records of two different firms.
The novelty of our work lies in the fact that the firm under study comes from an
institutional survey conducted on virtually every firm operating in Portugal. This will
allow us to pursue a more systematic analysis and to reach broader results. With the
present case study we must determine if the data are reliable as a representation of the
internal organization of the firm. At the same time we advance some new results and
try to point out possible new directions for the applied research.
The literature on internal labor markets is by now relatively extensive. We pretend
to test some of the main existing results with our applied analysis. The personnel
policies and the internal organization of the firm have been modeled, for example, by
Calvo and Wellisz (1979) and Waldman (1984b). The allocation of the most able
3workers to higher hierarchical layers and the skewness the wage distribution relative
to the distribution of the workers' ability is proved in those papers.
Bernhardt (1995) and Waldman (1984a) study the information signals sent by the
employer when he promotes a worker and pays a corresponding wage. Among the
same lines there is the work of Ricart I Costa (1988). The framework relies on the
assumption that there is an information asymmetry in the labor market where only the
current employer observes a worker's ability, while other firms observe the worker's
wage and occupation. The market therefore uses the worker's employment and
promotion history to reduce this information asymmetry. Given the signaling
propriety of the wage and promotion decisions, wages are attached to jobs and not to
workers' productivity. The employer also tries to extract some rents from the
employees, leading to an inefficient job assignment of workers and longer tenure in a
given job. The degree of the inefficiency is related with the human capital
composition. The higher is the proportion of general human capital, the higher is the
degree of the inefficiency.  In addition, as Bernhardt (1995) states, the driven forces of
wage growth are the job assignment and tenure at the job and not the total tenure at
the firm. In fact, tenure can have a negative impact in wage growth, when controlling
for the promotion and job assignment histories of the worker. If a worker is not
promoted and if the proportion of specific human capital, with no value in the external
labor market, increases with tenure, then the worker can have a negative wage growth.
The information asymmetry between the actual employer and the market
concerning the worker's ability can be related with the worker's visibility. A worker is
more visible if he can reveal in a more accurate way his ability to the market. Then,
the more visible is the worker, the smaller is the degree of the information asymmetry.
Milgrom and Oster (1987) prove that firms discriminate against invisible workers
given that promotion decreases the information asymmetry. The invisible workers
receive lower wages than visibles and have a lower probability of promotion. Then,
according to Bernhardt (1995) and Milgrom and Oster (1987) workers with more
years of schooling and only considering its signaling propriety about ability, have
better career prospects. Additionally, if a worker is promoted first, then he has a
higher probability of being again promoted first, given the information content of the
decision to promote − the "fast track" effect.
The promotion policy can also be thought as a tournament where workers compete
with each other to get a promotion. Lazear and Rosen (1981) prove that the workers
can be paid according to an ordinal rank and that this pay scheme is in some cases
superior to pay schemes based on the worker's productivity. Chan (1996) opens the
contest to outsiders. In that way the employees increase their effort given that the
probability of promotion is reduced. Additionally, when the firm wants to reduce the
4wage premium received upon promotion, then it can set different decision criteria
regarding the quality of the insiders and outsiders applicants in order to favor the
insider over the outsider in the contest. The result is that the external hires have to
possess a superior quality than the current employees to be recruited by the firm.
Manove (1997) argues that one way to induce workers' effort is to construct a job
ladder. The combination of the promotion motive with incentive wages increases the
gains of the employer. The result is valid, even if the jobs in the different hierarchical
layers do not correspond to different tasks. In addition to the use of a hierarchy with
several layers, the employer pursues an internal promotion instead of external hiring.
The analysis demonstrates that we can consider the information in the data as
valuable to study the internal economics of the firm. Furthermore this fact allows
moving from the case study to more comprehensive studies in personnel economics
using institutional surveys. We study the patterns of workers' promotions and the
differences in the characteristics of insider versus outsider workers. Namely that more
educated workers are assigned to the higher level of the hierarchy and that the
external hires although generally younger hold more years of schooling. The decision
to promote is modeled and estimated. The results show that more educated workers
have a higher probability of promotion and that the more time a worker remains in a
given level, the lower his probability of promotion. The hierarchic design directly
influences the wage policy. Wages are determined to a great extent by the layers of
the hierarchy. There are wage premiums upon promotion, even if the worker does not
change his place in the organization. In addition to estimate this positive effect of
promotion on wage growth, we decompose it in promotions within and between
levels. The effect of tenure on wage growth is small and negative, when controlling
for promotions. When the promoted worker moves up in the hierarchy he comes from
the top of the wage distribution at the old job and goes to the bottom of it in the new
job. We present evidence on workers' exit and entry to the bottom of the wage
distribution, especially in the lower part of the hierarchy.
We analyze the firm in the next section of the paper. First there is the overview of
the firm. The hierarchy, promotion policy and workers' entry and exit are analyzed in
the second part, the wage policy in the third. The paper ends with the conclusion and
appendix.
2. Analysis
2.1 The Firm
5The firm comes from a firm-based survey. We have chosen this firm for no particular
reason other than to have data for the five years of data available to us. It was an
aleatory draw as some information on the identification of the firm is concealed. The
objective is to explore and discuss results on the internal labor market of this firm.
The information contained in the data set reveals to us the employment history of
the worker. Namely, the date of entry, his place in the hierarchy, his promotions and if
and when he leaves the firm.  A description of the data set is found in the Appendix.
Pay variables are distinguished between base wage and total wage. The difference
between the two is the additional pay related to tenure, career and performance, as
defined by the survey: tenure-based compensation, bonus payments and other regular
compensations.
2.2 The Hierarchy of the Firm
The first objective is to determine if the levels can be considered layers in a hierarchic
structure, that is, if the levels reported define the hierarchy inside the organization and
if the promotion policy respects that hierarchy. The regulation concerning this data set
obliges the firm to assign a level to each worker. The firm has to "fit in" its own
hierarchy to the hierarchy implied by the levels defined by law, and each level
corresponds to a certain responsibility level and task complexity. Furthermore, the
information regarding the employees includes the date of last promotion, allowing us
to observe the changes in the employee's data at that date. This is unlike Baker, Gibbs,
and Holmstrom (1994a) who built the hierarchy using information on transitions
between job titles aggregated to form levels, and identified promotions as moving in
up the hierarchy.
Hierarchical Levels
There are eight levels, from Level 1, the highest rank (top executives), to Level 8, the
lowest rank (apprentices). (See the Appendix for a detailed description of the levels.)
A ninth level is considered (Level 99) that corresponds to "ignored and residual". The
sample has 19867 employee-years. The workers’ distribution by level for each year
and for the total of the five years is in Table 1. Although the size of each level remains
fairly stable over the five-year sample, Levels 1 and 2 increase their relative weight at
the expense of Levels 3, 4, and 5. The hierarchy does not present a pyramidal
structure: Level 8 can be considered unused by the firm; Levels 6, 7, 8, and 99
6represent 5% of the total number of workers; Levels 4 and 5 represent 51% of the
total in 1991, and 47% in 1995; Level 3 has less than 10% in 1995; Levels 1 and 2
represent 44% of the total. The number of levels and their nature is the same in all
years due to the fixed regulation used. We cannot capture changes in the hierarchical
structure in this sense.
There is no information on job titles. We have data on an individual's occupation,
but there again it is a variable categorized according to a national classification
system. We tried an analysis similar to the one presented herein using this individual's
occupation but as we expected it was not very fruitful.
Table 1. Level size by year and across years
Year
Level 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
All years
Total
sample
size
1 13% 16% 16% 19% 20% 17% 3302
2 18 20 20 22 24 21 4131
3 12 10 9 9 8 10 1924
4 25 26 23 21 18 23 4516
5 26 24 25 23 23 24 4842
6 3 3 5 2 2 3 591
7 2 2 1 1 1 1 252
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
99 0 1 0 3 4 1 298
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 19,867
Worker's Movements and Promotions
The workers’ movements from one year to the next by level summed over all years,
along with exits and entries are presented in Table 2. In the cells of the diagonal are
the workers who did not change level from one year to the next. Above the diagonal
are the workers who moved down at least one level. Below the diagonal are the
workers who moved at least one level up. For example, 85% of the workers in Level 2
stayed in that level in the next year, 8% moved to Level 1, and 7% exited the firm
over the five years of the sample. As we go from Level 5 to Level 1, we observe that
the percentage of stayers increases. Above the diagonal the transitions are rare, except
that 9% of the workers moved from Level 4 to Level 5.  Below the diagonal we have
movements of up by one level and, with lower figures, up by two levels. The figures
in Table 2 support the fact that the data supplied by the firm mirrors a hierarchy. It is
7not the “true” hierarchy, but rather, a filtered representation, shaped by the norms of
the survey. This proposition is supported by the fact that movements to lower levels
are rare, and movements to upper levels are mainly to the next level. Can these
movements of workers from one level to the next upper level be considered as
promotions, and the movements to the next lower level as demotions? As we have
data on promotions this issue is discussed in Table 3 (roughly 90% of the transitions
between levels can be explained by the data on promotions). This means that the
employees that move down in the hierarchy and are not promoted are the best
candidates to be considered as demoted.
Workers leave the firm irrespective of their position in the hierarchy: exit is present
in all levels (except for Level 8). Entry is about zero in Levels 3, 4, 7, and 8.
The transitions of workers through time can be visualized in Figure A1 in the
Appendix, where we plot the transitions from each year to the next. The four graphs in
the figure are alike. The pattern of the transitions is stable over the five years.
Table 3 shows the movements of the workers when they are promoted. The level
before promotion in one year is set against the new level after promotion in the next
year and summed across years. There are promotions within levels and between
levels. The cells in the diagonal of the table represent promotions within levels. The
cells off the diagonal represent promotions between levels. The fact that the promoted
worker remains in the same level means that the nature of his job did not change. The
use of promotion within levels by the firm can be thought as a way to incentive the
worker (Manove 1997). Promotions between levels are mainly to the next upper level.
Slightly more than half of the workers in Levels 2, 3, 6, and 7 moved up one level
upon promotion. We do not know if the individual had more than one promotion from
one year to the next, given that only the date of the last promotion in each year is
known. This may explain why there are workers promoted up by two levels or more.
Another explanation can be the existence of different career paths blurred by the
rigidity imposed by the survey norms.
8Table 2. Transition matrix, 1991-1995
New Level
Old Level
Exit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 99
Total
Sample
size
Entry 12 33 1 1 15 20 . 0 18 100 557
1 8 91 . . . . . . . 1 100 2352
2 7 8 85 . 0 . . . . 0 100 3127
3 9 . 12 73 1 4 . . . . 100 1625
4 7 . 4 1 77 9 0 . . 2 100 3829
5 10 . 1 3 8 78 0 . . 0 100 3946
6 31 0 . 0 3 7 58 1 . 0 100 507
7 16 . . 1 0 3 11 69 . . 100 217
8 . . . . . 100 . . . . 100 5
99 20 10 3 3 11 . 1 . . 52 100 99
Total 9 15 20 8 21 22 3 1 0 . 100 16,264
Transitions of all employees from one year (Old Level) to the next (New Level) are shown as percentage of the total at each Old Level.
9Table 3. Promotion matrix, 1991-1995
Level after promotionLevel
before
promotion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 99
Total
%
Sample
size
1 99 . . . . . . . 1 100 240
2 52 46 . 1 . . . . 1 100 444
3 . 54 26 6 14 . . . . 100 356
4 . 20 6 35 36 0 . . 3 100 762
5 . 5 14 42 39 1 . . 0 100 744
6 . . 2 22 51 18 6 . 2 100 65
7 . . . 3 15 58 25 . . 100 40
8 . . . . 100 . . . . 100 5
99 26 5 16 32 . 5 . . 16 100 19
Total 18 22 9 23 25 2 1 . 1 100 2675
Transitions of all employees promoted as a percentage of the total at each level before promotion across years.
The major exceptions are Levels 4 and 5 (there are transitions from 5 to 4, as well
from 4 to 5) where 27% of the workers in Level 4 were promoted to Level 5. The
other exceptions are the transitions from Level 3 to Levels 4 and 5 (6% and 14%
respectively). Nevertheless, 54% of the workers moved from Level 3 to Level 2.
Summing up, Levels 4 and 5 are those in which a clear statement on the
hierarchical ladder is problematic. As mentioned, it may be the case that different
ladders overlap. For example, technical and administrative workers can have different
paths along the hierarchy.
Tables 1 through 3 show that the hierarchical levels reported by the firm can be
considered as a representation of its internal organization. This is especially true of
Table 3 because with the pattern of workers' promotions, we can confirm if the ladder
represented by the levels is, in fact, the ladder that the worker climbs.
Promotion Policy, Entry, and Exit
We intend to analyze the assignment of workers to hierarchical levels. Namely, who is
promoted and what differences exist between the insiders and outsiders. If we
consider that the firm functions as an internal labor market, then there are differences
between the workers who are moving inside the firm and those who enter the firm for
the first time.
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Table 4 compares the entrants' characteristics with the insiders' characteristics by
Level. Are there specific points in the hierarchical ladder where workers enter or exit?
Entry occurs mainly in Levels 1, 2, 5, 6 and 99. Level 99 is a "natural candidate" to be
a port of entry. When the worker enter the firm, there can be a lag of time before he is
assigned to a specific hierarchical level. The problem is solved by assigning the
worker to this level, given that the firm must to assign a level to the worker when
answering the survey.  Are the figures evidence of the existence of "ports of entry"?
Clearly, what we can state is that there are "ports of no entry": the Levels 3,4, 7 and 8.
Nevertheless, for 1993 Level 6 can be considered a port of entry. In that year almost
50% of entrants to the firm, came in at this level. In all of the five years of the sample
that was the only time Level 6 was used as a level for new employees.
There is no evidence of "ports of exit": it occurs in all levels. The exit rate is higher
in Level 6. Nevertheless, the data can be misleading: given the size of each level,
Level 5 has the highest workers' exit, in absolute value, followed by Level 6 and
Level 2.
The average years of schooling of the workers who enter Level 1 and 2, from
outside or inside the firm, is higher than in any other level (except Level 99). The
difference between the average years of schooling between Level 1 and 2 (one year)
can be explained by the average age. The younger outside entrants into Level 2 have
experienced a reform of the educational system that added one year to upper
secondary education. If we consider schooling attainment as a measure of ability, then
the fact that in the upper hierarchical levels are the more educated worker is in line
with the results that the more able workers should be assigned to more complex and
responsible jobs (for example in Calvo and Wellisz 1979, Waldman 1984a, b, and
Bernhardt 1995).
The average age of new employees for a given level is lower than the average age
of those promoted into the level, except for Level 1. The reverse is true for the
average years of schooling. The entrants compensate for their lack of experience
inside the firm with general human capital. Or, if the new employees have more years
of schooling, and the specific human capital accumulated during the working life
inside the firm is not important to do the job, then they should have different career
paths. A slightly different case is possible if the firm experiences a change in the
nature of the jobs resulting from a change in the environment in which the firm
operates. Then it can be the case that more years of schooling are needed than before.
A firm can set up a compensation scheme with tournament for jobs where the outside
contestants have to possess higher ability than insiders as presented in Chan (1996).
Outside entrants to Level 1 are older, on average, than those entering Levels 2, 5 and
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6. In the highest rank of the hierarchy, not only the worker needs more years of
schooling, but also more years of experience.
The average age of the promoted workers within levels is higher than the average
age of the promoted workers between levels, comparing by levels, except for Level 5.
If we think of what to expect in the career path of a typical worker through his
working life in the firm, when he is promoted to a level (promotion between levels) he
has to wait some time in that level (and perhaps be promoted within the level) before
he experiences a second promotion between levels.
The promotion rate is lower in Levels 1 and 2 (and Level 6). In the other levels it
hovers around 20%. Nevertheless, if we go back to Table 3, the promotion matrix, we
observe that in Level 1 the promotion is only within level (obvious); the proportion of
promotion within levels decreases as we move down in the hierarchy; and the
promotion between levels increases in proportion.
There remains the issue of career duration. The data on workers entry are not
sufficiently informative to explore it, and we do not have enough periods to advance
much more. Nevertheless, 60% of the 1991 employees were still in the same level in
1995. This fact suggests that careers in this firm tend to be long. When discussing the
importance of careers, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a) found evidence that
supports this fact. If the firm explores the information advantage over the other firms
in the market about the employees' abilities, then the promotion is delayed at least to
some workers (Waldman 1984a, Ricart I Costa 1988, and Bernhardt 1995). The result
is an inefficient promotion of workers and longer tenure in a given level.
The decision to promote an employee can be further analyzed using a probit model.
If the worker fulfills a set of conditions, then the employer decides to promote him.
Medoff and Abraham (1980) and Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello (1999) follow this
approach by estimating a probit equation for the decision to promote. Table 5 presents
our preliminary results. Education has a positive effect on promotion. Better educated
workers can be considered not only more able by the firm but also are more visible to
the external labor market. Milgrom and Oster (1987) argue that the more visible
employees will have a higher probability of promotion. Nevertheless, the results in
Table 5 must be read with care given that we are using only the information for the
five-year sample and that education is probably correlated with hierarchical level. The
negative coefficient associated with tenure in the level means that the more time the
worker stays in a given level, the lower is his promotion probability.  Is this a sign of
fast track effects? We need more results to answer that question.
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Table 4. Level characteristics
Level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 99
Number of outside entrants at level 65 185 3 6 83 113 0 1 101
Average age of new employees 40 28 46 33 27 27 . 18 27
Average years of schooling of new employees 15 16 8 10 12 9 . 6 16
Average work experience of new employees 19 6 32 16 9 11 . 6 6
Number promoted into level 238 381 155 358 370 30 4 0 28
Average age of those promoted into level 37 39 44 40 39 32 44 . 36
Average years of schooling of those promoted into level 15 11 8 7 8 8 4 . 13
Average work experience of those promoted into level 16 22 30 26 25 18 34 . 17
Number promoted within level 238 203 91 267 287 12 10 0 3
Average age of those promoted within level 44 45 44 40 38 44 47 . 42
Average years of schooling of those promoted within level 15 11 8 10 7 5 4 . 9
Average work experience of those promoted within level 23 28 30 24 25 34 37 . 27
Number of person-years in level 3302 4131 1924 4516 4842 591 252 11 298
% of all entrants into level who were hired from outside 21 33 2 2 18 79 0 100 78
Promotion rate (%) 10 14 22 20 19 13 18 100 19
Exit rate (%) 8 7 9 7 10 31 16 0 20
Figures for all workers in the firm summed through 1991 to 1995. Exit rate uses workers who left the firm between 1992 and 1995. Promoted into the level are the workers who were promoted
and changed to the respective level in the table. Promoted within the level are the workers who were promoted and remained in the same level. Promotion rate is the total number of promoted
workers divided by the total number of workers in the level before promotion.
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A richer specification can be modeled for the decision to promote. The firm can
decide to promote a worker between levels or within levels, to not promote the
worker, or even to fire the worker (or the worker quits, which is a different event, a
decision taken by the employee, not the firm).
Table 5. Promotion − probit estimates
Independent variables Coefficient Standard error
Tenure -0.0441 0.0065
Tenure squared 0.0007 0.0002
Tenure in the level -2.1710 0.0389
Tenure in the level squared 0.4315 0.0092
Dummies for levels of education
Lower Primary 0.0035* 0.0475
Upper Primary 0.1551 0.0491
Lower Secondary 0.1322 0.0361
Upper Secondary 0.0301* 0.0632
University 0.1022 0.0496
Constant 1.2983 0.0649
Chi-squared 4224.22
Number of observations 14,766
Dependent variable: dummy equal to one every time the worker is promoted between 1991 and 1995. Random-
effects probit model using a generalized estimating equation approach. An asterisk marks the coefficients which
are not significant at any reasonable level. Tenure in the level defined for the current level if the worker is
promoted within levels or is not promoted and defined for the level prior to the promotion if the worker is
promoted between levels.
2.3 The Wage Policy
There are several theories that model the relationship between pay, promotions and
hierarchy. Namely, tournaments, incentive schemes, or information revelation can
explain the promotions associated with higher pay and the hierarchic design of a firm.
We expect to find, for example, a positive relationship between pay and hierarchical
level, as we move up in the hierarchy; that this hierarchical level explains the wage
level; promotions explain a great part of the wage increase during the working life of
the employee. We also want to look for the place of the worker in the wage
distribution when he enters the firm, leaves it, or is promoted.
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Wages and Hierarchical Levels
Over five-year window the relative position of the mean base wages did not change,
except for Levels 6 and 7 in the year 1993, as we can see in Figure 1. The relative
position of the mean base wage is parallel to the relative position of the levels. Thus,
as we move up the hierarchy the mean base wage increases. Comparing Figure 1 with
Figure 2, the mean total wage is higher than the mean base wage for all levels. The
figure has the same proprieties as Figure 1, but from 1993 onwards the mean total
wage of Level 5 is higher than the mean total wage of Level 4. Once again, and as a
sequence of what we have already stated for these levels, the wage data confirms that
considering them as two consecutive layers of the hierarchy is problematic for the
firm under study.
A question that Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a) tried to answer was whether
or not wages were attached to jobs. Bernhardt (1995) and Waldman (1984) prove that
wages are attached to jobs and not to workers' productivity. Given the signaling
propriety of the wage and promotion decisions, the willingness to pay depends on this
job assignment and not on the worker's ability. Looking at the evidence presented in
Figure 1, this seems to be the case. When the total wage is considered, it is not so
clear.
In Figure 3 we present the mean total wages and the 5th and 95th percentile in 1991
by level. Mean wages increase with level, as seen in Figure 2. Note also that a worker
can receive a lower wage than his colleague in a lower level. Even when the base
wage is considered, there is this overlap between wages from workers assigned to
different hierarchical levels (Figure A2 in the Appendix). Although the hierarchical
level appears to explain the wage level to some extent, the individual characteristics
also play a role.
Figure 3 also shows that the dispersion apparently increases with level, as well.
Table 6 presents a dispersion measure, standard deviation divided by the mean wage,
for base and total wage. Generally, the dispersion increases with the levels, looking by
raw. Looking by column, the dispersion of the total wage is higher than the dispersion
with base wages, except for Level 1. This means, once again, that the hierarchical
levels cannot explain all the wage differentials, and that the individual attributes grow
in importance as we move to more responsible jobs.
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Figure 1. Mean base wage by level from 1991 to 1995
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Figure 2. Mean total wage by level from 1991 to 1995
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Figure 3. Mean total wages and the 5th and 95th percentile in 1991
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Table 6. The wage dispersion by level - the coefficient of variation
LevelCoefficient of
variation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Base wage 1991 0.39 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07
Total Wage 1991 0.37 0.22 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.17
Base wage 1992 0.38 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.12
Total Wage 1992 0.33 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.19
Base wage 1993 0.51 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.33 0.23
Total Wage 1993 0.48 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.29
Base wage 1994 0.40 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.17
Total Wage 1994 0.35 0.20 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.23
Base wage 1995 0.43 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.10
Total Wage 1995 0.38 0.21 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.23
The table shows the coefficient of variation, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of wages in each year
for each level.
This does not mean that the levels have no effect on wages. We arrived at the same
results presented in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a) − that they do, indeed,
have a strong explanatory power, as can be observed in Table 7 where we run several
wage regressions. The first equation can be considered to be a human capital wage
equation. The second has only the levels as explanatory variables. Notice the jump in
the R-squared from 59% to 73%. The third equation combines the two sets of
regressors, resulting in another increase in the R-squared. The estimated coefficients
in the table show that higher education degree or hierarchic level implies a higher
wage. Including general experience in the labor market among the independent
variables does not change the results much. Cross section wage regressions were also
estimated and the results confirm those of Table 7.
In order to explore the relationship further, we tried to estimate the same regression
but with the difference between total and base wage as the dependent variable (results
shown in Table A2 in the Appendix). The R-squared drops drastically when compared
with Table 7, but the interesting result is that the dummies for levels in the hierarchy
are not significant at any reasonable level.
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Table 7. 1991-1995 pooled regressions − effects of human capital and hierarchical level on total wage
Independent variables
(i)
Human capital
(ii)
Levels
(iii)
Combined
Sex
-0.16
(0.0051)
.
-0.08
(0.0041)
Dummies for levels of education
Lower Primary
0.16
(0.0066)
.
0.07
(0.0052)
Upper Primary
0.29
(0.0074)
.
0.12
(0.0060)
Lower Secondary
0.34
(0.0052)
.
0.13
(0.0046)
Upper Secondary
0.73
(0.0090)
.
0.24
(0.0082)
University
1.08
(0.0072)
.
0.35
(0.0084)
Tenure
0.02
(0.0010)
.
0.01
(0.0007)
Tenure squared
-0.0001
(0.00003)
.
-0.0002
(0.00002)
Level 1 .
1.29
(0.0756)
1.01
(0.0724)
Level 2 .
0.74
(0.0756)
0.58
(0.0722)
Level 3 .
0.52
(0.0757)
0.41
(0.0722)
Level 4 .
0.39
(0.0756)
0.30
(0.0721)
Level 5 .
0.32
(0.0756)
0.25
(0.0721)
Level 6 .
0.12*
(0.0760)
0.10*
(0.0725)
Level 7 .
0.17
(0.0767)
0.14
(0.0732)
Constant
6.85
(0.0097)
6.82
(0.0755)
6.73
(0.0722)
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.73 0.76
Adjusted R2, without year dummies 0.58 0.72 0.75
Number of observations 19,364 19,419 19,364
Adjusted R2 with base wage as dependent variable 0.64 0.79 0.82
Dependent variable: log of hourly real total wage. Year dummies included in the regressions. Standard errors are in
parentheses. An asterisk marks the coefficients which are not significant at any reasonable level.
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Wage growth and promotions
What is the effect of promotions on the wage received by the worker? Directly related
to the issue discussed above are the effects of promotions on wages. If promotions and
job assignments have a signaling propriety, then not only should the change in level
accompanying promotion have a positive effect on wage, but so too should the
promotion which does not result in a level change (which we denominate as
"promotions within levels"). They imply that even if the worker changes only a job
title, the nature of his job remains the same and he stays in the same level following
the promotion. As already noted Manove (1997) argues that the firm can induce
individual effort with the worker's competition for a promotion, even if the after-
promotion job is qualitatively equal to the before-promotion job.
Table 8 computes the wage premiums for workers promoted and not promoted for
all levels and across years. The wage premiums are calculated in each year relative to
the wage increase of those workers who were not promoted in that year and stayed in
the same level, and then the mean wage growth across years is computed. The last
column of Table 8b presents the percentage difference on mean wages between levels.
In Table 8a we have the wage premiums for workers promoted and not promoted.
The workers promoted receive a wage premium. When the worker moves up in the
hierarchy the wage premium becomes higher with the level of arrival: the effect of
promotions is stronger in the higher levels. If the promotion is within levels, the
worker stays in the same level but receives a wage premium that in some cases is
higher than the wage premium received by their promoted colleagues who move to
the same level from below. The same data, but with base wages, show the same
propriety but for all levels, except for Level 6 (Table A3 in the Appendix). Promotion
has a positive effect on wages even if the worker does not experience a change in the
nature of his job assignment. Moving down the hierarchy upon promotion also has a
positive effect for Levels 4 and 5. The data for these levels must be read with care. As
we have already seen in Table 3, there are substantial movements of workers upon
promotion to Level 4 and 5, coming from upper levels. Concerning the movements to
Levels 6 and 7, there is a negative premium. Can we consider this promotion and
reassignment of the worker as a demotion? That would make no apparent sense. From
another perspective we can consider that their relative position inside the organization
declined.
When we look to the wage premiums of the workers not promoted, they are
negative for those who stay in Levels 4 or lower in the hierarchy and positive, but
small, for the other levels. The data on unpromoted workers who move up in the
hierarchy must be read with care, given that the total number of observations is 45
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employees for the five years. Nevertheless, moving up with no promotions implies a
substantial wage premium. The moves downward carry a negative wage premium.
Can these movements of not unpromoted workers to lower levels in the hierarchy be
considered as demotions? They are the best candidates.
Table 8a. Wage premiums − total wage
% wage premiums on:
promotions no promotions
Level down stay up down stay up
1 . 8.6 10.6 . 1.2 19.0
2 . 9.5 9.1 . 0.2 12.2
3 . 4.0 7.6 . 0.6 16.2
4 3.2 7.9 7.2 -0.6 -0.7 2.3
5 4.0 11.0 1.1 -4.5 -0.4 35.3
6 -2.8 -3.1 2.1 -20.9 -2.2 .
7 -12.1 5.9 . . -1.3 .
All 3.7 8.8 8.2 -2.1 0.0 14.0
All (base
wage)
3.8 10.4 7.1 -1.1 0.0 9.4
N 390 1111 1174 140 11,422 45
Table 8b. Wage premiums −  total wage
Difference in wage premiums:
promotions vs. no promotions
% wage premiums on all
(promotions plus no promotions)
Level down stay up down stay up
%
difference
on mean
wages
1 . 7.5 -8.4 . 0.9 5.5 38
2 . 9.2 -3.1 . 0.9 9.2 19
3 . 3.4 -8.6 . 0.9 8.2 21
4 3.8 8.6 4.9 1.7 0.1 7.0 1
5 8.6 11.5 -34.2 2.5 0.6 4.0 30
6 18.1 -0.9 . -5.4 -2.2 2.1 -3
7 . 7.3 . -12.1 -0.8 . 68
All 5.8 8.8 -5.8 2.2 0.7 8.5
All (base
wage)
5.3 10.7 -2.8 2.4 0.8 7.2
N 530 12,533 1219
Looking at all workers irrespective of being promoted or not in Table 8b, there is a
premium for those who moved up in the hierarchy. The premium is increasing with
the level, except for Level 1. There is a small premium for those workers who stay in
the same level and a negative premium for those who moved down in the hierarchy,
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except for workers who moved to Levels 4 and 5. These figures hide the differences
in the wage premiums upon workers promoted and not promoted for the same
movements as we have seen before. Comparing with Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom
(1994a), our results are similar except that we can distinguish the effect of promotions
within levels that does not show up when we used all workers, promoted or not.
The difference between the wage increase for workers promoted and not promoted
is presented in Table 8b. The difference is positive for those who stay in the same
level and for those who move up in the hierarchy.
These results are in line with previous empirical work (Baker, Gibbs, and
Holmstrom 1994a, McCue 1996, and Lazear 1999) and the theoretical work that
reveals the importance of promotions to explain the employee's wage path.
The difference in the mean wage by level is substantially greater than the wage
premiums. Promotions and/or movements between levels cannot explain all of this
wage variation.
In order to explore further the effect of promotions on wage growth we run the
regressions presented in Table 9. The results are similar to the ones in Lazear (1999).
The difference is that we can identify the two types of promotions: within levels and
between levels. A worker that is promoted one time between 1991 and 1995 has 7%
wage increase from the first regression. If we breakdown the number of promotions
into promotions between and within levels we observe that the coefficients do not
differ much. In the second regression the dependent variable is the annual change of
wages. The coefficient associated with promotion in a given year is also 7%, but the
coefficients associated with the two types of promotion differ. The effect of
promotion within levels is 8%, a value slightly higher that the effect of promotion
between levels, 6%. This result confirms the analysis on the wage premiums. The
worker receives an important wage increase every time he is promoted even if he does
not change his position inside the hierarchy. The effect of tenure is small and
negative. When controlling for promotions, we observe that the individual's total work
experience at the firm is not the major force behind wage growth, as predicted in the
model of Bernhardt (1995).
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Table 9. Wage growth and promotions
Independent variable
(i) 1991-1995 wage
growth
(ii)
Yearly wage growth
Total number of promotions
0.0673
(0.0040)
. . .
Total number of promotions between levels .
0.0699
(0.0048)
. .
Total number of promotions within levels .
0.0633
(0.0056)
. .
Promotion (dummy) . .
0.0690
(0.0033)
.
Promotion between levels (dummy) . . .
0.0571
(0.0041)
Promotion within levels (dummy) . . .
0.0858
(0.0048)
Tenure
-0.0028
(0.0004)
-0.0028
(0.0004)
-0.0010
(0.0002)
-0.0010
(0.0002)
Constant
0.0672
(0.0096)
0.0673
(0.0096)
0.0200
(0.0034)
0.0200
(0.0034)
Adjusted R2 0.1172 0.1172 0.0348 0.0363
Number of observations 3091 3091 14,263 14,263
Dependent variable: regression (i), change in log of hourly wage between 1991 and 1995; regression (ii), annual
change in log hourly wage. Standard errors are in parentheses. All coefficients are significant. Ordinary least
squares coefficients presented. Other estimation methods like the fixed-effects estimator were applied to regression
(ii), but the results remained qualitatively the same. Regression (i) uses the workers who were in the firm in 1991
and still remain there in 1995.
Promotions and Wage Distribution
This section analyzes the distribution of pay for promoted employees. We want to
find the wage decile before promotion and after promotion. Before and after
promotion we can find the place of the worker in the wage distribution of workers
who are in the same level as him.
If the employee changed level, then he was promoted between levels and we have
to place him in one wage decile in the level before the promotion and in another wage
decile in the level following the promotion. Table 10 shows the employees' transitions
of levels upon promotion and the resulting wage deciles. The promoted workers came
from all deciles. If that is so, we expect that the employees change their places in the
respective distribution, from the higher deciles in the level before promotion to lower
deciles in the level after promotion. That seems clear in data concerning the
promotions from Level 2 to Level 1. For the other cases it is not so clear. To highlight
22
this issue we computed the cumulative distribution of promotees for each case of level
change; that is, we put the cumulative distribution of promotees before promotion
against the cumulative distribution of promotees following promotion, summing the
values by row in Table 10. The results are in Figure 4. If more workers are promoted
from the top deciles, then the cumulative distribution should have more weight near
100%. If workers are promoted to the bottom deciles, then the cumulative distribution
should have more weight near zero. The resulting figure would have the plot of the
distribution before promotion under the distribution after promotion. Figure 4
confirms what we have just stated.
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Figure 4. Cumulative distribution of pay for workers promoted between levels
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c. from Level 4 to Level 3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deciles
%
Before promotion After promotion
d. from Level 5 to Level 4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deciles
%
Before promotion After promotion
e. from Level 6 to Level 5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deciles
%
Before promotion After promotion
Figure 4. (continued) Cumulative distribution of pay for workers promoted between levels
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Table 10. Distribution of pay for promotees between levels in salary deciles before and after promotion
Percentage in each wage decile
Promotion Statistic N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 all
from Level 2 Decile before promotion 233 0.9 0.4 2.6 3.4 3.9 15.9 27.0 12.9 18.5 14.6 100
to Level 1 Decile after promotion 233 49.4 15.9 8.2 11.6 5.6 3.4 3.4 1.7 0.9 0.0 100
from Level 3 Decile before promotion 193 6.7 8.3 5.7 6.2 7.3 9.3 10.9 14.5 16.6 14.5 100
to Level 2 Decile after promotion 193 7.8 8.3 6.7 22.8 13.0 11.4 13.0 11.4 5.7 0.0 100
from Level 4 Decile before promotion 46 4.3 17.4 6.5 4.3 6.5 13.0 15.2 8.7 6.5 17.4 100
to Level 3 Decile after promotion 46 28.3 10.9 15.2 10.9 4.3 2.2 8.7 6.5 0.0 13.0 100
from Level 5 Decile before promotion 311 9.3 11.9 12.2 8.4 10.6 12.9 15.4 8.0 6.1 5.1 100
to Level 4 Decile after promotion 311 10.3 12.2 6.4 5.8 4.8 13.2 12.9 7.1 17.4 10.0 100
from Level 6 Decile before promotion 33 6.1 0.0 12.1 12.1 6.1 6.1 9.1 18.2 18.2 12.1 100
to Level 5 Decile after promotion 33 21.2 27.3 18.2 12.1 9.1 3.0 6.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 100
from Level 7 Decile before promotion 23 4.3 8.7 21.7 21.7 17.4 8.7 13.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 100
to Level 6 Decile after promotion 23 4.3 4.3 8.7 26.1 8.7 13.0 30.4 0.0 0.0 4.3 100
Shows the place of the worker in the wage distribution of all workers in the same level before and after he is promoted summed for all years.
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The reverse is true for promotions within levels. Table 11 shows the distribution of
pay for promoted workers who remained in the same level following the promotion
and compares the deciles before and after promotions. If the individual's wage
increases following the promotion and if he stays in the same level, then he moves
from lower deciles to upper deciles. The information in the table does not allow
reaching a conclusion concerning these movements of the workers up in the
distribution. Nevertheless, if we observe Figure 5 (that plots the cumulative
distribution of workers before and after the promotion for each level), the distribution
following the promotion is always under the distribution before promotion. There is a
shift in the number of workers from the bottom deciles to the top deciles. This shift is
in the reverse direction of the shift that resulted from promotion in which the worker
moved up one level in the hierarchy.
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Figure 5. Cumulative distribution of pay for workers promoted within levels
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c. Level 3
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Figure 5. (continued) Cumulative distribution of pay for workers promoted within levels
27
Table 11. Distribution of pay for promotees within levels in salary deciles before and after promotion
Percentage in each wage decile
Promotion Statistic N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 all
From Level 1 Decile before promotion 236 6.4 3.8 7.6 11.0 11.4 11.9 13.1 13.1 13.1 8.5 100
to Level 1 Decile after promotion 236 5.1 5.1 3.4 11.4 8.9 11.9 10.6 14.0 16.1 13.6 100
from Level 2 Decile before promotion 203 13.3 21.2 17.7 8.4 7.9 5.9 10.3 3.0 6.9 5.4 100
to Level 2 Decile after promotion 203 0.5 3.9 17.2 20.2 4.4 12.3 12.3 7.4 8.4 13.3 100
from Level 3 Decile before promotion 91 3.3 6.6 5.5 15.4 9.9 27.5 11.0 8.8 11.0 1.1 100
to Level 3 Decile after promotion 91 3.3 1.1 3.3 15.4 12.1 17.6 14.3 13.2 18.7 1.1 100
from Level 4 Decile before promotion 267 13.1 21.3 16.5 12.0 12.0 5.6 10.9 4.5 2.6 1.5 100
to Level 4 Decile after promotion 267 3.7 10.1 10.9 12.7 14.2 11.6 14.2 8.2 10.1 4.1 100
from Level 5 Decile before promotion 287 16.7 9.4 14.3 8.4 9.8 9.4 9.4 10.1 7.3 5.2 100
to Level 5 Decile after promotion 287 14.3 6.3 6.3 7.0 8.4 10.5 9.8 13.2 9.4 15.0 100
Shows the place of the worker in the wage distribution of all workers in the same level before and after he is promoted summed for all years. Levels 6, 7 and 8 excluded, due to limited number
of observations.
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Exit and Wage Distribution
If a worker does not match with his employer or does not match up with his
colleagues, he has a high probability of leaving the firm. In addition his relative wage
should be low. As a result, when he leaves the firm, his last place in the wage
distribution should be at the bottom.
Table 12 computes workers' exit by wage decile from each hierarchical level of the
firm. The bottom decile has the highest percentage of exits, except in Level 1 and
Level 6. Beyond that fact, we can not add much. What is stated above finds some
support in the data. The percentage of exit seems to decrease as we move up in the
wage distribution, but in Level 1 the top deciles have the highest percentage of exit
and in Level 4 the top decile as the second highest value. The exits from the top decile
can be interpreted as the worker accepting better proposals from other firms. We
performed a Chi-squared test to see if the workers flow out of the firm in a uniform
way (10% from each decile) as Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a). This
hypothesis was refuted in all levels. In the paper just mentioned the authors did not
find evidence of significant workers' selection upon exit. The evidence on the firm
that we analyze shows that exit has a role in the selection of workers in the
hierarchical levels.
Table 12. Distribution of pay for workers that exit the firm
Percentage from each wage decile
Level N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All
1 186 11.3 7.0 7.5 10.2 5.4 9.1 7.0 11.3 11.3 19.9 100
2 209 12.0 9.6 12.4 8.6 9.1 12.0 12.9 7.2 7.2 9.1 100
3 147 28.6 16.3 10.2 12.9 7.5 4.1 7.5 4.1 1.4 7.5 100
4 264 22.7 9.1 6.8 8.7 8.0 7.2 7.6 8.7 7.2 14.0 100
5 379 21.1 9.8 10.6 9.8 11.9 10.3 9.0 6.3 5.0 6.3 100
6 144 17.4 13.9 14.6 13.9 18.1 4.2 6.9 4.9 2.1 4.2 100
7 34 23.5 2.9 0.0 11.8 8.8 5.9 11.8 17.6 14.7 2.9 100
Shows the place of the worker in the wage distribution of all workers in the same level when he exits the firm
summed for all years.  Chi-squared tests were performed to test the hypothesis of a uniform distribution (10% in
each decile): the hypothesis was rejected in all levels of the hierarchy.
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Entry and Wage Distribution
The worker is expected to enter to at bottom deciles of the wage distribution. Table 13
presents the wage distribution at entry. Although workers' entry occurs in all deciles
of Level 1, it is concentrated in the top deciles. We can link this fact with the analysis
of Table 3, where the workers hired into this level are older, have more years of
schooling, and have more years of experience in the labor market than the do entrants
into other levels. We can surmise that the general human capital plays a higher role in
this level, which does not allow the firm to treat the outsiders too differently from the
insiders. In Level 2 we have a similar situation, although not as pronounced. As we
move down in the hierarchy there a clear tendency to place the newly hired workers in
the bottom deciles. Notice that fewer than 5% of the workers are placed in the second
half of the wage distribution for Levels 6 and 99.
Table 13. Distribution of pay for workers who enter the firm
Percentage to each wage decile
Level N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All
1 64 9.4 3.1 6.3 7.8 3.1 12.5 6.3 9.4 15.6 26.6 100
2 185 3.8 3.8 7.0 3.2 10.8 18.4 15.7 22.7 11.9 2.7 100
5 81 7.4 8.6 38.3 27.2 6.2 3.7 1.2 3.7 3.7 0.0 100
6 98 20.4 18.4 18.4 16.3 20.4 2.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 100
99 86 27.9 48.8 3.5 9.3 8.1 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
Shows the place of the worker in the wage distribution of all workers in the same level when he enters
the firm summed for all years.
3. Conclusion
The objectives of the analysis performed were to assess whether or not the data
available could be used to study the internal economics of the firm and whether or not
we could reach manageable results. We have fulfilled both objectives to some extent.
The data set is unique in the perspective of personnel economics. We are not using the
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firm personnel records. Instead we are using information contained in a large survey
of firms gathered annually by the employment authorities. This fact allows for the
moving from the case study to more comprehensive studies.
The hierarchical levels assigned to the employees by the firm replicate the true
hierarchy of the firm. The firm has its own hierarchic structure that is filtered by the
mandatory rules of the survey. With the analysis of the workers' transitions between
levels and the firm promotion policy we established that there is a hierarchical ladder
that the employee climbs during his working life. Furthermore the promotion patterns
respect the organization design, translated into promotions mainly to the next upper
hierarchical level, given that this level corresponds to an increase in the task
complexity and responsibility.
The study of the promotion policy can be extended with a direct estimate of the
factors that influence the worker's probability of promotion. The results show a
positive effect of education and a negative effect of tenure in a given hierarchical
level on the promotion probability.
The analysis of the wage policy could be undertaken after ascertaining that the data
were valuable for studying the hierarchy of the firm. The wage structure is determined
by the hierarchic structure. This determination is not complete but the results show a
strong relationship between the two. If the levels cannot explain all of the wage
variation, then there is evidence and the firm also pays the workers according to the
individual performance. The individual effects are stronger in the upper levels of the
hierarchy, as the wage dispersion increases.
The wage path along the working life is strongly influenced by the promotion
policy of the firm. The worker's promotion implies a positive wage premium. If we
distinguish between promotion between levels and promotion within levels, then we
find that being promoted and staying in the same level is sufficient to receive a higher
wage. Thus, promotion by itself − promotion within levels − has a positive effect on
wages (that is, with no change in the job nature with respect to responsibility and
complexity, the worker experiences a wage jump). The effect of promotion on wage
can be further explored by estimating and quantifying this effect. The results
presented show that promotion sorts the employees between higher earners and lower
earners, given that promotion implies a higher wage growth.
Four major events were related to the wage distribution: promotion between and
within levels, exit, and entry. The workers promoted between levels come from the
top of the wage distribution but move to the bottom of it in their new level. On the
contrary and obviously, workers promoted within levels move from the bottom to the
top of the wage distribution of their colleagues in the same level. Though there is
workers' exit independently of the wage received, there is some evidence that it is
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concentrated in the bottom of the wage distribution. Entry is also concentrated in the
bottom of the distribution, especially for those hired into the lower levels of the
hierarchy.
The next step in this research is to find ways of applying the same type of analysis
to a sample of firms and to get readable results.
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Appendix
A. Data Set Description and Summary Statistics
The survey, Quadros de Pessoal, that the Ministry of Employment annually collects
from the Portuguese firms, is the data source used in this paper. The survey includes
the data collected in questionnaires that are sent to Portuguese firms every year. Every
firm with more than one employee gives information about workers' personal
characteristics and firm characterization. The firm is required by law to respond to the
survey. The reference month is March until 1993. After this year the reference month
is October. The survey does not cover the individuals in the army and civil servants.
The sample used in this paper dates from 1991 to 1995. As explained above, the
objective is to study the internal economics of firms using this data set. As a first step
toward achieving that goal, we draw aleatorilly one firm from the original data set,
requiring only that the firm was present in all years of the survey.
The data is yearly based. This means that we do not know what happens to the
worker between two consecutive years. Furthermore, it is possible that some workers
are hired and fired within the year and that fact does not show up in the employee
records. Until 1993 the survey was conducted in March. The yearly data used in this
paper is constructed in a way that the period ends in this month and not on the
previous December 31. In this perspective, we respect the fact that the reports are for
a specific month and not for the end of the year. Otherwise the analysis conducted
would be in the wrong path. The drawback is that the 1994-year is longer than 12
months: starting in that year the survey was conducted in October. In any event, this
problem persists even if another approach to the data is used.
We describe the variables used below.
Qualification level. Classification of jobs according to the task performed and skill
requirement. Each qualification level can be considered as a layer in a hierarchy
defined in terms of increasing responsibility and task complexity. The firm is required
to classify jobs using these levels defined by law (Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2). The
levels are:
Level 1 − top executives;
Level 2 − intermediary executives;
Level 3 − team leaders;
Level 4 − higher qualified professionals;
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Level 5 − qualified professional;
Level 6 − semi-qualified professionals;
Level 7 − non-qualified professionals;
Level 8 − apprentices;
Level 99 − ignored and residual.
Level of education. Last completed level of education (years assigned to each level
between brackets): illiterate (0 years); can read and write (0 years); Lower primary (4
years); Upper Primary (2 years); Lower Secondary (3 years); Upper Secondary (2/3
years); University (3 years for baccalaureate or 5 years for undergraduation). After
1978 the Upper Secondary had one more year.
Date of admission. Variable used to compute the worker's tenure in the firm.
Date of last promotion. Variable used to compute the timing of the worker's
promotion.
Base wage. Monthly base wage. All the monetary variables are real values in 1995
constant PTE using the CPI.
Tenure-based compensation and bonuses. Additional monthly compensation paid to
the worker in a regular fashion.
Other regular compensations. Additional monthly regular compensation.
Total wage. Sum of the previous three variables.
34
Table A1. Summary statistics
Year
Variable Statistic 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Tenure mean 17 17 16 17 17
Age mean 43 43 42 43 43
Years of schooling mean 9 9 9 10 10
Mean base wage mean 200,314 212,783 235,759 226,491 235,174
std. dev. 118,107 125,093 154,771 141,598 149,205
Mean total wage mean 257,754 269,683 290,518 280,420 292,768
std. dev. 128,484 128,576 164,560 140,462 149,170
Entry rate (%) 0.3 2.7 5.8 1.9 3.6
Exit rate (%) . 13.6 8.1 10.0 4.2
Employment growth
(%)
. -8.9 -2.0 -7.1 -1.1
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B. Additional Tables and Figures
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Figure A1. Workers' transitions from one year to the next
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c. 1993-1994
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Figure A1. (continued) Workers' transitions from one year to the next
37
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
900,000
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
4
|
5
|
6
|
7
|
8
Figure A2. Mean base wages and the 5th and the 95th percentile in 1991
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Table A2. 1991-1995 pooled regressions − effects of human capital and hierarchical level on total
minus base wage
Independent variables
(i)
Human capital
(ii)
Levels
(iii)
Combined
Sex
-0.37
(0.0121)
-0.29
(0.0123)
Dummies for levels of education
Lower Primary
0.14
(0.0156)
0.06
(0.0156)
Upper Primary
0.14
(0.0174)
0.08
(0.0178)
Lower Secondary
0.18
(0.0123)
0.07
(0.0136)
Upper Secondary
0.13
(0.0213)
0.06
(0.0246)
University
-0.12
(0.0172)
-0.17
(0.0252)
Tenure
-0.002*
(0.0022)
-0.003*
(0.0022)
Tenure squared
-0.0003
(0.0001)
-0.0003
(0.0001)
Level 1
-0.01*
(0.2356)
0.16*
(0.2295)
Level 2
0.34*
(0.2355)
0.42
(0.2289)
Level 3
0.54*
(0.2357)
0.55
(0.2290)
Level 4
0.03*
(0.2355)
0.12*
(0.2287)
Level 5
0.18*
(0.2355)
0.20*
(0.2287)
Level 6
-0.24*
(0.2368)
-0.16*
(0.2299)
Level 7
-0.18*
(0.2389)
-0.03*
(0.2320)
Constant
5.89
(0.0229)
5.60
(0.2352)
5.72
(0.2289)
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.09 0.15
Adjusted R2, without year dummies 0.08 0.09 0.14
Number of observations 19,147 19,199 19,147
Dependent variable: log of hourly additional pay. Additional pay is the difference between total wage and base
wage or: tenure-based compensation plus bonuses plus other regular compensations. Year dummies included in
the regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. An asterisk marks the coefficients not significant at
any reasonable level.
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Table A3a. Wage premiums - base wage
% wage premiums on:
promotions no promotions
Level down stay up down stay up
1 . 13.8 11.0 . 1.3 18.6
2 . 11.3 9.4 . 0.4 7.0
3 . 5.4 3.1 . 1.6 13.7
4 2.3 9.0 5.6 -0.6 -1.2 -0.1
5 4.4 11.2 2.6 -3.2 -0.8 21.2
6 -3.6 -6.0 -0.3 -20.0 -1.7 .
7 -13.7 9.6 . . 0.0 .
All 4.0 10.6 7.4 -1.3 0.0 10.2
N 390 1111 1174 140 11,425 45
Table A3b. Wage premiums −  base wage
Difference in wage premiums:
promotions vs. no promotions
% wage premiums on all
(promotions plus no promotions)
Level down stay up down stay up
%
difference
on mean
wages
1 . 12.5 -7.7 . 1.5 6.5 60
2 . 10.8 2.4 . 1.3 9.4 34
3 . 3.8 -10.6 . 1.9 3.8 8
4 2.9 10.1 5.8 -0.1 -0.2 5.4 8
5 7.7 12.0 -18.6 3.0 0.3 4.1 20
6 16.4 -4.3 . -6.0 -1.8 -0.3 -1
7 . 9.6 . -13.7 0.6 . 68
All 5.3 10.7 -2.8 2.6 0.9 7.5
N 530 12,536 1219
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